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Because appeals from the boards of contract appeals and the Court of 
Federal Claims involving contract disputes comprise a sliver of the volume 
of cases heard by the Federal Circuit,1 any government contract decisions 
issued are of significant import to the government contracts community. 
In one area of focus—the evolving requirements of contract claims—the 
contracting officer’s duty of claim resolution is more challenging than 
ever. This Foreword examines the historical development of contract 
 
 * Chair, Civilian Board of Contract Appeals. 
The views expressed are my own and in no way attributable to the United States 
Civilian Board of Contract Appeals, my colleagues, or to the United States Federal 
Government. I thank my law clerk, Matthew Lewis, for assisting me with this Foreword. 
 1. For example, of the types of appeals heard by the Federal Circuit, the total 
time devoted to the patent docket has been estimated by one Federal Circuit judge as 
exceeding 80%. See Timothy B. Dyk, Foreword, Federal Circuit Jurisdiction: Looking Back 
and Thinking Forward, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 971, 973 (2018). 
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appeals and the role of contracting officers in the dispute process, and 
highlights recent decisions impacting contracting officers. 
GOVERNMENT CONTRACT APPEALS AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 
The primary jurisdiction of the boards of contract appeals has been 
government contract cases under the Contract Disputes Act (CDA).2 
Various fora resolving these disputes have existed since the founding 
of our nation. Courts and boards have been created, separated, and 
combined through a patchwork of legislation and administrative 
action before finally arriving at the judicial forum we see today. Under 
current law, CDA claims are first heard by a contracting officer,3 before 
being appealed to either a board of contract appeals or the Court of 
Federal Claims (CFC) under a shared jurisdiction. From there, a case 
may be appealed from either forum to the Federal Circuit and might 
be heard by certiorari in the Supreme Court. 
The role of the contracting officer is unique. Initially, the 
contracting officer functions as the government’s advocate while 
negotiating for the government. The contracting officer’s role changes 
once he or she is called to render a final decision under the disputes 
clause. This quasi-judicial duty of the contracting officer is a 
particularly important nuance to the field of government contracting. 
It is only after a contractor has submitted a claim to the contracting 
officer that a case may be brought to either the CFC or a board of 
contract appeals.4 The contracting officer also must make a final 
decision (or fail to do so within the required period of time) before a 
claim is appealable. In this decision-making role, a contracting officer 
has an obligation not only to follow the applicable laws and regulations 
but also to treat contractors fairly.5 This role in making preliminary 
 
 2. Pub. L. No. 95-563, 92 Stat. 2383 (1978) (codified as amended at 41 U.S.C. 
§§ 7101–7109 (2012)). 
 3. A contracting officer is “a person with the authority to enter into, administer, 
and/or terminate contracts and make related determinations and findings.” FAR 
2.101 (2018) (defining “Contracting Officer”). 
 4. 41 U.S.C. §§ 7103–7105. 
 5. S. REP. NO. 95-1118, at 1 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5235, 5235 
(explaining one of the purposes of the Contract Disputes Act of 1978 as “insur[ing] 
fair and equitable treatment to contractors”); FAR 33.211 (outlining the steps a 
contracting officer must follow when making a decision); FAR 1.602-2(b) (describing 
contracting officers responsibilities to include “[e]nsur[ing] that contractors receive 
impartial, fair, and equitable treatment”); see also Penner Installation Corp. v. United 
States, 89 F. Supp. 545, 547 (Ct. Cl. 1950) (“[T]he contracting officer must act impartially 
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decisions serves as a gatekeeper in one sense, alleviating the burden 
on the fora that would otherwise hear these complaints if the disputes 
could not be resolved at the contracting officer level. If appealed, the 
contracting officer’s final decision and the underlying administrative 
record provide the initial evidentiary record, though the boards and 
CFC allow the record to be supplemented and will hear issues of both 
law and fact de novo.6 
I.    HISTORY OF CONTRACT APPEALS 
A.   Early History 
Contracts with the federal government (or what would become the 
government) extend back to the time of the Revolutionary War, 
preceding formal design for contracting disputes or appeals.7 Under 
the structure of the Articles of Confederacy, the power to pay federal 
expenses would be decided by the “United States, in Congress 
assembled.”8 After the founding of the current United States 
government, the underlying principle of sovereign immunity 
(affecting contracting disputes to this day)9 limited the ability of courts 
to resolve contract claims against the United States.10 Thus, if a federal 
contractor sought to be reimbursed for a claim, they would take their 
claims directly to Congress or to the Treasury Department.11 
One of the most famous government procurements highlights the 
early relationship between the United States government and federal 
contractors. In 1798, fearing a potential war with France, Congress 
 
in settling disputes. He must not act as a representative of one of the contracting parties, 
but as an impartial, unbiased judge.”), aff’d per curiam, 340 U.S. 898 (1950). 
 6. 41 U.S.C. §§ 7104–06. 
 7. See Space Gateway Support, LLC, ASBCA Nos. 55608, 55658, 13-1 BCA ¶ 35,232. 
 8. Floyd D Shimomura, The History of Claims Against the United States: The Evolution 
from a Legislative Toward a Judicial Model of Payment, 45 LA. L. REV. 625, 634 (1985) 
(citing ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. VIII, para. 1). 
 9. See, e.g., PAE-Parsons Glob. Logistics Servs., LLC v. United States, 145 Fed. Cl. 
194, 197–98 (2019) (reviewing the limits of the Tucker Act and sovereign immunity). 
 10. See Shimomura, supra note 8, at 637 (citing 2 W. COWEN, P. NICHOLS & M. 
BENNETT, THE UNITED STATES COURT OF CLAIMS 4 (1978)); Collin D. Swan, Government 
Contracts and the Federal Circuit: A History of Judicial Remedies Against the Sovereign, 8 J. FED. 
CIR. HIST. SOC’Y, 105, 105–06 (2014). 
 11. See Shimomura, supra note 8, at 644–45 (citing Charles C. Binney, Origin and 
Development of Legal Recourse Against the Government in the United States, 57 U. PA. L. REV. 
372, 381 (1909)); Swan, supra note 10, at 106. 
1058 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:1055 
 
allocated $800,000 for purchasing military equipment.12 Eli Whitney, 
already well known for inventing the cotton gin, received a contract 
award to manufacture firearms.13 In 1801, seeking additional time to 
perform his contract, he conducted an in-person demonstration of his 
work on the contract for John Adams (the active president), Thomas 
Jefferson (the president-to-be), and other officials.14 To exhibit his 
progress, he unloaded standardized firearm components onto a table 
and proceeded to give one of the first demonstrations of an 
interchangeable parts system, where he picked up parts at random 
from the pile (or at least appeared to do so) and showed how any 
individual part would fit any other part it was intended to mate with.15 
Whitney’s contract demonstration, now famous, provides an example 
of the hands-on approach to contract disputes. It also highlights the 
inefficiency of the early system. This direct communication with elected 
officials proved not to be practical going forward. Growth of federal 
contracts led to an increasing amount of contract disputes that Congress 
had to hear and vote on . . . or perhaps ignore.16 From 1838 to 1848, 
there were 17,574 contract petitions to Congress, with few petitions 
receiving approval by the House and Senate.17 
To resolve this issue, in 1855, Congress established the Court of Claims 
to hear disputes from government contractors.18 However, the original 
version of this court was less than effective.19 Congress had not provided 
the Court of Claims with the authority of final judgment, and Congress 
would instead review the decisions made by the court. This system left 
many contractors wanting, as Congress might reject the court’s decision 
or ignore the court’s judgments.20 In his 1861 congressional address, 
President Lincoln alluded to this inefficient system: “It is as much the duty 
of Government to render prompt justice against itself, in favor of citizens, 
as it is to administer the same between private individuals. The 
 
 12. James V. Joy, Jr., Eli Whitney’s Contracts for Muskets, 8 PUB. CONT. L.J. 140, 142 (1976). 
 13. Id. at 143. 
 14. Id. at 144. 
 15. Id. 
 16. See Swan, supra note 10, at 106–07 (describing the difficulties faced by Congress 
in dealing with significant increases in claims). 
 17. Id. at 106 (citing 2 W. COWEN, P. NICHOLS & M. BENNETT, supra note 10, at 10). 
 18. Act of Feb. 24, 1855, ch. 122, 10 Stat. 612. 
 19. Swan, supra note 10, at 107. 
 20. Id.; see also Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 9, § 2, 12 Stat. 765 (providing that petitions 
and bills for private claims be sent to the court “unless otherwise ordered by resolution 
of the house in which the same are presented or introduced”). 
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investigation and adjudication of claims, in their nature belong to the 
judicial department . . . .”21 Accordingly, in 1866, Congress granted the 
Court of Claims the authority to issue final judgments, thereby securing 
contractor appeals from both congressional action and inaction.22 
B.   Early Contracting Officials and Disputes Clauses 
While authority over contracting disputes was granted to the Court 
of Claims, practical barriers prevented the court from actually deciding 
many disputes. Contract disputes clauses were developed and 
implemented into government contracts beginning in the nineteenth 
century.23 These clauses, different than what is now supplied in 
contracts pursuant to the CDA, provided an agency official or board 
with the authority to resolve contract appeals.24 Some clauses might 
provide that a contracting officer’s decision was the final 
determination of fact, while others would give contracting officers or 
agency officials the power to decide both law and fact, limited only by 
administrative review.25 Thus, while courts had jurisdiction to hear 
contract disputes, any actual review of contracting officer or 
administrative action was limited.26 
In one early example, Kihlberg v. United States,27 the government 
contracted to transport supplies and goods by railroad. The contract 
stipulated that reimbursement would be paid based upon the shipping 
distance determined by the chief quartermaster.28 The quartermaster, 
however, made a determination inconsistent with the reality of 
performance, resulting in contract reimbursement that under-recognized 
the contractor’s monetary entitlement.29 Yet, because both the government 
 
 21. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 2d Sess. app. at 2 (1862); see also Swan, supra note 
10, at 107–08 (describing President Lincoln’s comments regarding the Court of 
Federal Claims’s limitations during his 1861 inaugural address to Congress). 
 22. Act of March 17, 1866, ch. 19, 14 Stat. 9. 
 23. See James V. Joy, The Disputes Clause in Government Contracts: A Survey of Court 
and Administrative Decisions, 25 FORDHAM L. REV. 11, 13 (1956). 
 24. Franklin M. Schultz, Proposed Changes in Government Contract Disputes Settlement: 
The Legislative Battle over the Wunderlich Case, 67 HARV. L. REV. 217, 217 (1953). 
 25. Id. 
 26. See Comment, Government Contracts Disputes: An Institutional Approach, 73 YALE 
L.J. 1408, 1410–11 (1964) (noting that a contractor had little power in the bargaining 
of disputes clauses); see also Arthur V. Wittich, Contracting with the Federal Government: 
The Dispute Resolution Process, 5 PUB. LAND L. REV. 128, 129 (1984). 
 27. 97 U.S. 398 (1878). 
 28. Id. at 401. 
 29. Id. 
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and the contractor had agreed to be bound by the chief quartermaster’s 
determinations, the court found the chief quartermaster’s decision to be 
binding and not to be overturned on appeal outside of fraud, gross mistake 
indicating bad faith, or “failure to exercise honest judgment.”30 
This deference to contract clauses and contracting officer decisions 
was maintained for many years,31 culminating in the unanimous 
decision in United States v. Moorman.32 The Court found that the 
determination of the “contractually designated agent,” here the 
Secretary of War, was conclusive absent “fraud, or such gross mistake 
as necessarily implied bad faith,” a more limited standard than the 
early Kihlberg decision.33 The Court also noted the policy of such 
clauses as enabling more efficient settlement, saving the government 
from costly litigation.34 
Just three years later, however, the Supreme Court would further restrict 
judicial review of contracting officers and agency decisions in United States 
v. Wunderlich.35 According to the contract, the contracting officer’s factual 
determinations were final, and the contractor could only appeal the 
officer’s determinations to the agency’s secretary.36 The Court held that, 
where a contract contained a disputes clause granting determinative power 
to government officials, fraud presented the only ground to overturn the 
decision and must be established by the contractor.37 
 
 30. Id. at 402; see also United States v. Joseph A. Holpuch Co., 328 U.S. 234, 237–40 
(1946) (holding that the contractor must exhaust the administrative appeal procedure 
before pursuing claims in court); United States v. Blair, 321 U.S. 730, 734–36 (1944) 
(stating that even if the contracting officer’s conduct was such “as to imply bad faith” the 
contractor must exhaust his administrative appeals before going to court). 
 31. See Merrill-Ruckgaber Co. v. United States, 241 U.S. 387, 393 (1916) (holding 
that the judgment of a supervising architect was determinative of an appeal when the 
contract indicated that disputes would be decided by that architect); Plumley v. United 
States, 226 U.S. 545, 547 (1913) (stating that the Secretary’s construction 
determinations were conclusive due to the contract language). 
 32. 338 U.S. 457 (1950). 
 33. Id. at 461 (citations and quotations omitted). 
 34. Id. at 460. 
 35. 342 U.S. 98, 100–01 (1951); see Government Contracts Disputes, supra note 26, at 
1430–31. 
 36. Wunderlich, 342 U.S. at 99, 101. 
 37. Id. at 100. Some judges recognized the problems with this holding. See id. at 
102 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“We should allow the Court of Claims, the agency close 
to these disputes, to reverse an official whose conduct is plainly out of bounds whether 
he is fraudulent, perverse, captious, incompetent, or just palpably wrong.”); see also id. 
at 103 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“Men are more often bribed by their loyalties and 
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The Wunderlich decision was met with widespread criticism, 
including by government agencies who might benefit from the 
holding,38 and quickly became an issue before Congress.39 In 1954, 
Congress passed the Wunderlich Act in response to the case.40 The Act 
provided that, “any such [agency] decision shall be final and 
conclusive unless the same is fradulent [sic] or capricious or arbitrary 
or so grossly erroneous as necessarily to imply bad faith, or is not 
supported by substantial evidence.”41 The biggest difference here 
between the Act and pre-Wunderlich precedent being the right to 
appeal decisions not supported by substantial evidence. 
C.   Modernization of the Appeals System 
In 1969, Congress created a commission to review the federal 
contracting system and to recommend changes to Congress.42 The 
resulting CDA created the structure that we see today in contractor 
disputes.43 The CDA incorporated the function of contracting officers 
in their quasi-judicial capacity, while also subjecting their 
determinations to review by a structured system of courts and boards.44 
The CDA also reduced the impact of the administrative record by 
allowing both the boards and the CFC to supplement the record and 
make de novo determinations of both law and fact.45 Further, Article 
III appellate judges within the Court of Claims were granted authority 
 
ambitions than by money. I still believe one should be allowed to have a judicial 
hearing before his business can be destroyed by administrative action . . . .”). 
 38. See Schultz, supra note 24, at 233 (noting that criticism was widespread and 
both the Department of Defense and General Services Administration agreed “to 
return the disputes clause to its pre-Wunderlich meaning by administrative 
amendment”; see also Swan, supra note 10, at 111 (explaining that “[t]he [Wunderlich] 
decision alarmed many in the procurement community”). 
 39. Schultz, supra note 24, at 233 (noting that four remedial bills were introduced 
in the House of Representatives and two were introduced in the Senate in response to 
the Wunderlich decision). 
 40. Act of May 11, 1954, ch. 199, §§ 1–2, 68 Stat. 81 (formerly codified at 41 U.S.C. 
§§ 321–22 (1958)). 
 41. Id. 
 42. See Pub. L. No. 91-129, 83 Stat. 269 (1969); Clarence Kipps et al., The Contract 
Disputes Act: Solid Foundation, Magnificent System, 28 PUB. CONT. L.J. 585, 588 (1999). 
 43. See Wittich, supra note 26, at 130–31 (noting that the development of the contract 
remedies system was unplanned and reactionary but culminated with the CDA). 
 44. See Jeri Kaylene Somers, Foreword, The Boards of Contract Appeals: A Historical 
Perspective, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 745, 752–54 (2011). 
 45. See, e.g., United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709, 713 (1963) (noting 
that the Court of Claims may make de novo determinations of disputed fact). 
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to hear appeals from either forum, with de novo review of law but a 
more limited review of factual determinations.46 
As noted in the introduction, this expanded appeal right requires 
contractors to submit a claim to the contracting officer as a preliminary 
requirement for an appeal.47 One consequence arising from this right 
is that, where contractors historically had appeal limitations due to 
disputes clauses, contractors now may find claim requirements to be a 
primary remaining jurisdictional barrier for contract appeals. 
Although a claim under the CDA does not require a certain format, it 
must include particular information so that a contracting officer is in 
a position to make a final decision on the claim.48 In this way, a claim—
a written demand by one of the parties “as a matter of right” for the 
payment of money, alteration of the contract, or some other type of 
relief49—has similarities to the pleading requirements of a civil case.50 
The standards for claims as preliminary dispute requirements can be 
seen in Federal Circuit cases since the implementation of the CDA. For 
example, in Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton,51 the Federal Circuit considered 
whether a contractor’s communications to the contracting officer 
could constitute a claim when there was no dispute between the parties 
 
 46. Wittich, supra note 26, at 144. The trial division of the Court of Claims was later 
separated to create the Claims Court, and the appellate division was split off to create 
the new Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 
1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, § 127, 96 Stat. 25, 37–38. The Claims Court would be 
renamed as the Court of Federal Claims with the Federal Courts Administration Act 
of 1992. Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 902, 106 Stat. 4506, 4516; see also Pensive Poser, What’s 
in A Name? Or Does A Court by Any Other Name Smell As Sweet?, 48 PROCUREMENT LAW. 16 
(2013) (tracing the history of the Court of Federal Claims name changes). 
 47. See 41 U.S.C. § 7103 (2012); FAR 2.101 (2018); Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton, 60 
F.3d 1572, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (“Under the CDA, a final decision by a 
[contracting officer] on a ‘claim’ is a prerequisite for Board jurisdiction.”). 
 48. See FAR 52.233-1 (declaring a claim must be in writing with a certification); M. 
Maropakis Carpentry, Inc. v. United States, 609 F.3d 1323, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2010) 
(noting that a valid claim “need not be submitted in any form or use any particular 
wording” but it must give the contracting officer notice of the basis and amount of the 
claim and also indicate a request for a final decision). 
 49. FAR 2.101 (defining “Claim”); see also Reflectone, 60 F.3d at 1575 (noting that 
the CDA does not define a claim, so it is necessary to look to the FAR implementation 
of the CDA for the definition). 
 50. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 8 (requiring a claim for relief contain “a short and plain 
statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction,” a short and plain statement of 
the claim, and a demand relief is sought). 
 51. 60 F.3d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc). 
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at the time the written claim documents were submitted.52 The court, 
en banc, determined that where the requirements of a claim were met 
in a nonroutine request for payment a dispute did not need to yet exist 
for a contractor to meet the jurisdictional requirements.53 
The Federal Circuit also addressed claim requirements in its 2010 
Maropakis decision.54 Maropakis considered a claim for a construction 
contract that was running behind schedule, implicating liquidated 
damages and time extension issues.55 The contractor appealed to the 
CFC, who found that it had no jurisdiction due to failure to meet claim 
requirements.56 The contractor’s claim was based on a letter that it had 
submitted to the contracting officer requesting a time extension and 
indicating that it would dispute liquidated damages in the future.57 The 
court found that the contractor’s letter was deficient as it lacked adequate 
notice of the amount and basis for the claim, but it also held that the 
intent of the contractor in their communications was insufficient.58 
II.    RECENT FEDERAL CIRCUIT DECISIONS 
The development of contract appeals and contractor claim 
requirements bring us to among the most notable government 
contracting cases of this year by the Federal Circuit, Hejran Hejrat Co. v. 
United States Army Corps of Engineers59 and DAI Global, LLC v. 
Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development.60 
Hejran Hejrat examined the distinction between contractor 
communications to a contracting officer that constitute a claim, versus 
those that do not.61 Citing to prior Federal Circuit decisions in 
Reflectone and Maropakis,62 the court reiterated that magic words were 
not required as an element of a CDA claim: “‘a CDA claim need not be 
submitted in any particular form or use any particular wording’ so long 
as it has ‘a clear and unequivocal statement that gives the contracting 
 
 52. Id. at 1577–78. 
 53. Id. 
 54. M. Maropakis Carpentry, Inc. v. United States, 609 F.3d 1323, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 55. Id. at 1325–26. 
 56. Id. at 1326. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 1328 (finding that “[a] claim cannot be based merely on intent to assert a claim 
without any communication by the contractor of a desire for a contracting officer decision”). 
 59. 930 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 60. 945 F.3d 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 61. Hejran Hejrat, 930 F.3d at 1357. 
 62. Id. 
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officer adequate notice of the basis and amount of the claim.’”63 
Accordingly, the court found that the contractor’s communications 
constituted a claim even where the contractor had not requested a 
final decision and where the contractor had previously communicated 
that it was not pursuing a claim.64 In reaching this holding, the court 
magnified the final decision difficulties of a contracting officer. A 
contracting officer should no longer rely on the contractor’s 
characterization of its communications when determining if they 
should issue a final decision. 
In DAI Global, the Federal Circuit considered the line between when 
a claim certification did not meet the minimum certification 
requirements versus when the certification was merely defective, 
thereby allowing the contractor to correct the claim and preserve 
contract appeal jurisdiction.65 In the case, the contractor was 
apprehensive about assuming responsibility for claims sought by its 
subcontractor but was required to certify the subcontractor’s claim for 
the subcontractor to pursue reimbursement.66 In order to meet claim 
requirements, the contractor phrased its certification in a way that 
limited its stated accountability for improper subcontractor claims.67 
The contracting officer, however, was late to notify the contractor that 
it had issued a defective certification.68 Therefore, the Federal Circuit 
determined that the claim was deemed denied and that the 
contractor’s certification phrasing was sufficient to constitute a 
defective and correctable certification under the statute.69 The Federal 
Circuit’s decision underscores the importance of contracting officer 
timeliness and indicates that contractors may have more leeway when 
phrasing their certifications going forward. 
 
 63. Id. (quoting M. Maropakis Carpentry, Inc. v. United States, 609 F.3d 1323, 1327 
(2010) (citation and quotations omitted)). 
 64. Id. 
 65. See DAI Global, 945 F.3d at 1198; see also 41 U.S.C. § 7103(b) (2012) (requiring 
contractors to submit a claim to contracting officer with certification as a preliminary 
requirement for an appeal); FAR 33.201 (2018) (defining defective certification). 
 66. See Dev. Alternatives, Inc. v. Agency for Int’l Dev., CBCA 5942, 18-1 BCA ¶ 
37,147, rev’d, DAI Global, 945 F.3d 1196 (Fed. Cir. 2019). 
 67. DAI Global, 945 F.3d at 1197. 
 68. Id. at 1197–98. 
 69. Id. at 1200; see 41 U.S.C. § 7103(b)(3) (requiring, to excuse obligation to 
render a final decision, the contracting officer to notify within sixty days of reasons 
why a certification was defective). 
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OUTLOOK 
Hejran Hejrat and DAI Global also highlight two historical 
developments in federal procurement: the long-term expansion of 
contractor appeal rights and the role of the contracting officer as a 
preliminary judge of contractor claims. By allowing imprecise 
communications to be the basis of a CDA claim—and therefore an 
appealable issue—the Federal Circuit follows the historical trend of 
allowing more appeals to be heard and resolved on the merits rather 
than barring or restricting appeal rights to agency determinations or 
procedural requirements.70 However, the decisions also allowed the 
contractor to bypass the preliminary review and decision making of a 
contracting officer, in contrast with the traditional role of the 
contracting officer as the preliminary decision-maker in contract 
claims. Additionally, Hejran Hejrat and DAI Global make a contracting 
officer’s administrative role more difficult, as a contracting officer can 
no longer necessarily rely on their understanding of a contractor’s 
communications when deciding whether to issue a final decision. The 
holdings in both cases perhaps suggest that a contracting officer 
should issue a final decision on any questionable reimbursement 
communications as a safeguard.71 
Contract appeals, whether from the contracting officer’s final 
decision or from a judicial decision to the Federal Circuit, are a distinct 
aspect of government contracting law that underlies much of the federal 
procurement system. The structure has seen significant change over the 
years but remains an important part of the contracting process as seen 
through the Federal Circuit’s recent decisions. These developments 
make this year’s Federal Circuit review—as well as future reviews from 
this publication—of great interest to the procurement community. 
 
 70. See e.g., United States v. Joseph A. Holpuch Co., 328 U.S. 234, 239 (1946) (noting 
that no court can justify disregarding the letter or spirit of appeal provisions arising 
under a contract); Sikorsky Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 773 F.3d 1315, 1322 (Fed. 
Cir. 2014) (finding the CDA statute of limitations to be nonjurisdictional); Reflectone, 
Inc. v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 1572, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (en banc) (holding a contractor’s 
communications to the contracting officer could constitute a claim when there was no 
dispute between the parties at the time the written claim documents were submitted). 
 71. See Ralph C. Nash, Postscript V: Requests for Equitable Adjustments vs. Claims, 33 
NASH & CIBINIC REP. ¶ 58 (2019) (opining that contracting officers should now issue a 
final decision while also asking contractors if they mean to file a claim). 
